Digital Commons @ Assumption University
Political Science Department Faculty Works

Political Science Department

2018

Review of Writing Conscience and the Nation in Revolutionary
England by Giuseppina Iacono Lobo
Geoffrey M. Vaughan
Assumption College, gvaughan@assumption.edu

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.assumption.edu/political-science-faculty
Part of the Ethics and Political Philosophy Commons, European History Commons, History of
Christianity Commons, and the Political History Commons

Recommended Citation
Vaughan, Geoffrey. "Review of Writing Conscience and the Nation in Revolutionary England by Giuseppina
Iacono Lobo." Seventeenth-Century News vol. 76 no. 3/4 (Fall-Winter 2018): 184-188.
http://hdl.handle.net/1969.1/172925.

This Book Review is brought to you for free and open access by the Political Science Department at Digital
Commons @ Assumption University. It has been accepted for inclusion in Political Science Department Faculty
Works by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons @ Assumption University. For more information, please
contact digitalcommons@assumption.edu.

184

seventeenth-century news

Giuseppina Iacono Lobo. Writing Conscience and the Nation in
Revolutionary England. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2017.
x + 253 pp. $75.00. Review by Geoffrey Vaughan, Assumption
College.
Giuseppina Iacono Lobo has taken up the history of conscience
in the political, ideological, and theological conflicts of seventeencentury England. This period is one of the best examples of the
problems that arise when people are motivated by their consciences.
As she demonstrates through exhaustive archival and textual research,
conflicts over the meaning of conscience and the attempts to achieve a
“clear” conscience or preserve freedom of conscience weave themselves
through all the most contentious theological and political moments
of seventeenth-century England.
The Introduction to the book gives a short account of the history
of conscience, mostly in the wake of Henry VIII’s break with Rome.
This reader found it the weakest part of the book. It is at once too
apologetic, trying to justify the point of her study, and too superficial.
This would have been the place to address the deep theology underlying
the idea of conscience. When the theology changed, conscience took
on a different role. Had she done so, there would have been no need
for justifying her argument. For instance, in her brief look at one of
the most famous engagements of conscience since the early Christian
martyrs, she writes, “When faced with the scruples or grudges of their
consciences, both Henry and More grounded their interior surety upon
the exterior consensus of what they perceived as Christendom” (12).
Up to a point. Thomas More described himself as God’s servant first,
not a servant to the consensus of Christendom. This is the problem
with the idea of conscience, a problem Christianity has struggled
with since the beginning. On the one hand, it is a religion of right
belief, orthodoxy, unlike Judaism which is a religion of right practice,
orthopraxy. As she explains, because Christians were released from the
practices of Jewish law, Paul had to introduce the idea of conscience as
a means of knowing when one was in the right or the wrong. In other
words, where the priest is commanded in Leviticus 1:16 to throw the
crop and feathers of a sacrificed bird to the east of the altar, throwing
them to the west is clearly wrong. But what does the Christian do?
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Even the passage she cites from Paul contains the seeds of the problem: “For if the blood of bulls and of goats, and the ashes of an heifer
sprinkling the unclean, sanctifieth to the purifying of the flesh: How
much more shall the blood of Christ, who through the eternal Spirit
offered himself without spot to God, purge your conscience from dead
works to serve the living God?” (Hebrews 9:13–14 KJV). Those “dead
works” might be left behind, but service still requires action on the
part of the Christian, that is, it requires practice in the world. Some
practices will be sinful and others not, presumably, so the distinction
between orthodoxy and orthopraxy is not so clear.
While many cultures, religions and philosophies have adopted
the idea of the conscience, or something like the tribunal within the
self that we take it to be, it is at root a Christian concept. Even Greek
philosophy did not develop a fully formed idea of it as the Christian
theologians would do, starting with St. Paul. It is for this reason
there is no equivalent of Augustine’s Confessions earlier or elsewhere.
Historians of ideas have studied the origins of the conscience and its
spread. What they have paid less attention to is the question of why
anyone would want to import a foreign idea that seems to bring with
it nothing but trouble, both individually and politically. Lobo does
not try to answer this question of why, but she does give a clear picture
of the problems conscience can lead to.
Once one gets past the first chapter, the book and author come
into their own. The close reading of the exchanges between Charles I
and his advisors is exemplary. These men, and they were all men, truly
struggled with their consciences. The fate of the kingdom and the king’s
head, ultimately, rested on how they judged their actions or thought
God would judge them. Where does responsibility lie? Is it the case,
as one of the soldiers Henry V spoke with while disguised on the eve
of battle, that if “his [the king’s] cause be wrong, our obedience to the
king wipes the crime of it out of us” (Henry V 4.i 183–85)? But this
puts all the blame on the king, meaning the king alone is responsible
for the souls of his soldiers. Henry’s response, “Every subject’s duty
is the king’s; but every subject’s soul is his own” (4.i 230–32), is as
self-serving in this instance as it is well argued. It is also a literary
miniature of what really went on between Charles I and his advisors
John Ashburnham, John Culpepper, and Sir Henry Jermyn. As Lobo
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shows, their arguments were not realpolitik dressed in theological language. Clearly their positions, lives, and monarchical government itself
were at risk, but so was this precious thing called conscience. These
men did not separate the two. The author quotes a letter from 1646
in which Charles I writes, “I stick not upon scruples, but undoubted
realities, both in relation to conscience and policy” (31). Conscience
was as real to him as were the armies massing in the field.
This correspondence would be remarkable enough, were it not
that the Eikon Basilike was published immediately upon the king’s
execution. This book was presented as the private meditations of
Charles I, a look inside the man and his relation to God. It was not
a justification for his actions or retort to his detractors. One could
imagine it having no political importance at all. But that was not the
case. Quite the opposite. It became one of the most important tracts in
the Civil War, going through many printings and distributed widely. As
Lobo points out, many of the surviving copies are so worn by obvious
signs of use as opposed to neglect, that it is clear the book was read
and not simply purchased (37). “It was so popular precisely because
it was not designed to look like propaganda; instead it was designed
to look like and, as I argue, serve the function of a devotional book”
(39–40). She certainly does not overlook the propagandistic elements
and uses of the book: “Charles was a king in life, a king in his suffering, and he will be a king in death: his readers could hardly replicate
this trajectory” (40). But such a book would have had no purchase
with readers if they had not also the same concerns about their own
consciences. They might not have the same royal trajectory as Charles
I, but as Christians they did have a parallel trajectory. Again, it is this
wariness about the theology that holds Lobo back from diving deeper
into the subject.
She comes closest to a theological study in her chapter on the
Quakers. According to Lobo, they had a peculiar understanding
of conscience as an external entity in which we, as individuals, can
share. Again, a more theological explanation would serve the reader
and her argument. Is this Quaker idea a version of monopsychism,
normally attributed to Averroes and roundly criticized by Aquinas in
his De unitate intellectus contra Averroistas? It certainly seems similar.
Or might it be connected to Justin Martyr’s idea of the logos sperma-
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tikos? More to the point, this kind of deep theological problem of
conscience that long predates the seventeenth century underlies the
arguments. Certainly, not all Quakers were reading Aquinas or Justin
Martyr, but there were enough academics upon whom the king could
call who were.
One of the more contentious arguments in the book is the author’s
claim that Thomas Hobbes was trying to use the idea of conscience as
a means of bringing peace and obedience to the kingdom. According
to Lobo, “Through his creation of the public conscience, then, Hobbes
makes conscience itself the very cornerstone of the commonwealth”
(117). Earlier she claims that “Conscience is thus a civilizing force in
the condition of war, inclining the individual to give up his absolute
liberty for the security and survival a commonwealth offers” (107).
Her argument is that the public conscience developed by civil society
replaces any private conscience an individual might have had in mere
nature. This is how she explains Hobbes’s insistence that it is seditious
to claim that anything done against one’s conscience is a sin (113).
But it could be just as easily, and I think more convincingly, argued
that what Hobbes was doing with the idea of conscience was redefining it into oblivion. If conscience were to become this “public” thing
outside the individual and lodged in the institutions and laws of the
commonwealth, the problem of individual conscience as a legitimate
means of resistance to the state disappears. Indeed, conscience disappears into orthopraxy, just as Hobbes would have wanted.
The most interesting chapter of the book is that on Lucy Hutchinson. Where all other major figures Lobo addresses are men, here we
have the case of a woman playing a central role in the debates and politics connected to conscience. The episode itself is rather complicated,
as it involves Lucy Hutchinson trying to save her husband who had
signed the death warrant of Charles I, by allegedly forging his recantation. All of it is ably handled by Lobo and the role of conscience, of
both husband and wife, duly explored. As a poet in her own right and
the translator of Lucretius, Lucy Hutchinson’s thoughts on the matter
and role in the politics of the time are a fascinating part of the book.
The final chapter is on Milton and is another strong piece. She
reads his works closely and widely and records some impressive finds.
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For instance, she tells us that a 1667 copy of Paradise Lost contains
marginalia precisely on her theme. Someone wrote the words “Horrors
of Conscience” beside Sin’s description of her children. It is probably
here, in the chapter on Milton, that her thesis that conscience was
central to the idea of the nation is at its strongest and may, in fact, be
its origin. This reader finds it hard to accept the case for much of the
rest of the book. Again, this is because of her allergy to theology. This
tendency becomes all the more apparent in her Afterward in which
she turns to Matthew Arnold. There she notes his distinction between
the French Revolution, which pressed the case of rationality, and the
English, which relied on conscience. But she seems insensitive to a
problem of which Arnold was well aware and, in fact, for which he is
famous. His “long, withdrawing roar” on Dover Beach was faith slipping away. The French Revolution was the most obvious and violent
expression of this. The English Revolution was not that. It might be
considered the last (violent) gasp of the wars of religion. Thereafter
we had wars of ideology, where conscience spoke not at all.
This is a fine work of scholarship. The criticisms noted here cannot
take away from the accomplishment that it is. Lobo has not taken
the argument in all the ways this reviewer might have wished, but it
makes no less of a contribution for that. Instead, the materials here
assembled and the insights provided will be a source of many future
debates and disagreements, all of them better because of this work.

